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RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF LENIENCY:
IMPLICIT PLEA AGREEMENTS AND
THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE AS A
MINISTER OF JUSTICE
ELI PAUL MAZUR
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors routinely acquire the incriminating testimony of co-
defendants, co-conspirators, informants, jailhouse snitches, and wit-
nesses through the use of plea bargains and inducements.1 The Su-
preme Court has explicitly recognized that plea bargains and
inducements create motivations to lie.2 Nevertheless, the function and
history of the plea bargain is ingrained in our system of justice, and
courts consistently hold that the existent procedural safeguards are
sufficiently stringent to protect the accused from any unfair prejudice
created by bargained-for testimony.3
The accused is protected by various procedural mechanisms that
expose the existence of bargained-for testimony and allow the ac-
cused to attack its credibility.4 The negotiation, creation, and per-
formance of plea agreements and inducements are governed by rules
Copyright © 2002 by Eli Paul Mazur.
1. See, e.g., Marcus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 592 (1997) (stating that “plea bargains dis-
pose of approximately 90 percent of criminal cases”).
2. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) (recognizing the inherent motiva-
tion to lie created by bargained-for testimony); see also, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-
Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (“It is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie
than the inducement of a reduced sentence . . . .”).
3. For the purposes of this Note, this position is acceptable. See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at
311 (“The established [procedural] safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the
veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be
determined by a properly instructed jury.”).
4. See infra notes 128–41 and accompanying text.
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of criminal procedure and informed by rules of professional conduct.5
For instance, a plea bargain between the state and a testifying witness
is discoverable,6 many plea bargains are written, and the prosecution
has an ethical and legal duty to disclose the agreement for its exculpa-
tory value.7 Moreover, all plea agreements are subject to the scrutiny
of a properly instructed jury and zealous cross-examination by de-
fense counsel.8 These procedural safeguards exist to promote justice
and accuracy in the courtroom.9 They recognize that when a prosecu-
tor offers leniency or money in exchange for incriminating testimony,
there is a tremendous incentive for the witness to fabricate, self-
exculpate, and cooperate.10
However, these safeguards fail to protect the rights of the ac-
cused and the integrity of the court when a witness cooperates with
the prosecution but is not a party to a formal plea agreement.
Through affirmative behavior, office policy, or a past course of con-
duct, a prosecutor can create a “rational expectation of leniency”11
5. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (regulating the making of plea agreements); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1997) (noting that the prosecutor shall “make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense”).
6. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (specifying the plea agreement procedure).
7. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972) (holding that the prosecution’s
failure to disclose a plea bargain with a testifying codefendant warranted a new trial because
evidence questioning the credibility of a key prosecution witness is exculpatory in nature and
nondisclosure constitutes a Brady violation); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
(“The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The
jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of
guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in tes-
tifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (1997) (taking a more expansive view than the Supreme Court or the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure of the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence by
requiring “disclosure . . . of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate” guilt or mitigate the sentence of the accused).
8. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 311.
9. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness . . . to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 2
(“These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding.
They shall be construed to secure . . . fairness in administration . . . .”).
10. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987).
11. For purposes of this Note, a “rational expectation of leniency” results when a reason-
able witness would believe—based on a prosecutor’s affirmative conduct, office policy, or prior
course of conduct—that he can minimize his punishment by providing the testimony the prose-
cutor desires. However, it should be noted that rational expectations of a benefit, such as the
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within the mind of a testifying witness. This rational expectation of
leniency spawns the same dangers to the veracity of testimony and
the credibility of witnesses as do traditional plea bargains.12
The stringent procedural safeguards governing plea bargains,
however, are relaxed and rendered ineffective when the prosecution
and the testifying witness do not reach a formal agreement.13 Cross-
examination and jury instructions, as presently used, fail to apprise
the jury of the equally pervasive motivations to fabricate and self-
exculpate possessed by witnesses who testify with a rational expecta-
tion of leniency instead of a formal plea agreement.14
Experience and social science suggest that a witness’s propensity
to fabricate is just as compelling whether he has a rational expecta-
tion of leniency or a formal agreement promising leniency.15 The wit-
ness who testifies without a formal agreement is acutely aware of the
heightened importance of the substance, power, and incriminating na-
ture of his or her testimony, because his or her liberty might be con-
tingent on the success or failure of the prosecution’s case. In addition,
jurors often give more weight and credibility to accomplice testimony
where no formal plea agreement exists, because the testifying accom-
plice appears to waive his or her right against self-incrimination and
to testify out of a desire for absolution and repentance.16 Therefore,
courts and prosecutors should recognize that the dangers posed by
traditional plea bargains are equally pervasive when a witness has a
rational expectation of leniency attributable to the prosecution.17
This Note shows that rational expectations of leniency implicate
the same doubts about the veracity of testimony as traditional plea
bargains. Furthermore, it argues that prosecutors, as ministers of jus-
tice entrusted to protect the procedural rights of the accused,18 violate
payment of money, also could influence witness testimony. Throughout this Note, I will use the
phrase “rational expectation of leniency” to convey both concepts.
12. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 151–71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 151–71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
16. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599–600 (1994) (implying, in an opinion
by Justice O’Connor, that a codefendant’s testimony, when the codefendant has not executed a
plea bargain, has enhanced credibility because “[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie is to mix
falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-
inculpatory nature”).
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1997) (“A prosecutor has the re-
sponsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries
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their ethical duties when they engage in implicit plea bargaining be-
cause such conduct circumvents and renders ineffective the proce-
dural safeguards erected to protect the accused.
In Part I, I describe three situations in which prosecutors rou-
tinely create rational expectations of leniency in the minds of testify-
ing witnesses without using formal plea agreements. I also describe
the case law on the issue of informal plea agreements. In Part II, I ex-
plore the jurisprudence of the traditional plea bargain. The academic
literature surrounding the Singleton19 and Williamson20 cases articu-
lates the two dangers institutionalized plea bargains pose to the ad-
ministration of justice. In Part III, I demonstrate how courts have
constructed procedural safeguards to ensure the rights of the accused.
In Part IV, I explore how and why a witness’s rational expecta-
tion of leniency implicates the same dangers to the administration of
justice as the institutionalized plea bargain. I consider the relevant so-
cial science research into the effects of a witness’s rational expecta-
tion of leniency. Research shows that witnesses are more likely to lie,
more likely to cooperate, and more likely to fabricate when agents of
the state make implicit rather than explicit promises of leniency.
Moreover, the procedural safeguards erected to protect the accused
from the dangers of the institutionalized plea agreement are ineffec-
tive when a witness merely has a rational expectation of leniency.
In Part V, I propose two solutions to mitigate the problems
posed by rational expectations of leniency. First, I propose that, for
the purposes of cross-examination, confrontation, and jury instruc-
tions, courts should not differentiate between witnesses who testify
against the accused under a formal agreement or under a rational ex-
pectation of leniency. Second, I propose that prosecutors should ex-
plicitly recognize the ethical implications created by the implicit plea
bargain and rational expectations of leniency: prosecutors’ creating
rational expectations of leniency in exchange for testimony violates
ethical, legal, constitutional, and moral standards of conduct. As es-
tablished by the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Conduct, the prosecutor, as a minister of justice and not solely an ad-
vocate, has a duty to eliminate the practice of making implicit plea
bargains.
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice . . . .”).
19. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Singleton I];
United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Singleton II].
20. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
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I.  JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF LENIENCY
The United States Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland 21
that the prosecution is required to disclose all exculpatory evidence to
the accused.22 The Court held in Giglio v. United States 23 that the
prosecution’s failure to disclose a formal plea bargain with a testifying
witness constitutes a Brady violation because the existence of the plea
bargain calls into question the credibility of a key prosecution witness
and therefore is exculpatory.24 In Giglio, the defendant had “smoking
gun” evidence of the prosecution’s undisclosed, formal oral agree-
ment with the witness; a government affidavit confirmed that an assis-
tant district attorney made an overt promise not to prosecute the co-
operating witness.25 However, in many cases the defendant is unable
to obtain such good evidence. Rather, the defendant must rely on
persuasive circumstantial evidence that the prosecution conveyed a
promise, agreement, or rational expectation of leniency overtly or
covertly to a cooperating witness.26 For example, the fact that the
prosecution permitted a co-conspirator who testified against the de-
fendant to plead guilty to a lesser offense might constitute evidence
that an implicit agreement existed.27
A defendant might show that the prosecution created a rational
expectation of leniency in the mind of a testifying witness in any of
three ways. First, the defendant might allege that the prosecutor cre-
ated such an expectation through affirmative conduct.28 Second, the
defendant might allege that the prosecutor’s office had an unofficial
“office policy” of charging cooperating witnesses with lesser of-
fenses.29 Third, the defendant might allege that the prosecutor’s past
course of conduct, over a substantial period of time, gave the cooper-
ating witness, and his or her attorney, a rational expectation of leni-
21. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
22. Id. at 87.
23. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
24. Id. at 153–54.
25. Id. at 152.
26. See infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
fact that the witness for the government pled guilty to a lesser offense three days after trial was
not enough to establish the existence of an agreement); Haire v. State, 8 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Ark.
2000) (“The mere fact, standing alone, that the charges [against the co-conspirator] were
dropped after the trial does not establish a Giglio violation.”).
28. E.g., Zuern v. Tate, 101 F. Supp. 2d 948, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
29. E.g., Darden v. United States, 405 F.2d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 1969).
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ency in exchange for cooperation.30 In this Part, I show how courts
have disposed of these three types of claims.
A. Affirmative Conduct of a Prosecutor
In Zuern v. Tate, William Zuern was convicted and sentenced to
death for murdering a prison guard.31 After exhausting his state court
remedies, Zuern filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court arguing
that his conviction violated several provisions of the Constitution.32 In
particular, Zuern argued that the prosecution, in violation of Brady33
30. Most commonly, a prosecutor’s past course of conduct will create the rational expecta-
tion of leniency. A myriad of cases highlight this problem and demonstrate the method that
courts utilize to dispose of these claims. See, e.g., Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 268–70 (1st
Cir. 1995) (refusing to grant a new trial where two prosecution witnesses denied the existence of
a deal); Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 822–24 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that newly discov-
ered evidence relating to promises of leniency made by the prosecution to incriminating wit-
nesses was not credible); United States ex rel. Fazio v. Fay, 348 F.2d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 1965)
(holding that testimony was not perjured or false where defense counsel only questioned the
incriminating witness on his subjective expectations of receiving leniency in exchange for testi-
mony); United States v. Pheribo, 346 F.2d 559, 560–61 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that a witness’s
expectations of leniency were sufficiently exposed by zealous cross-examination); Zuern, 101 F.
Supp. 2d at 970–72 (holding that a witness’s expectation of leniency, even if proved, does not
implicate Brady because no explicit agreement existed between the state and the witness);
Brown v. Keane, No. 97-C3302, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9615, at *9–*13 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1999)
(holding that no tacit agreement existed where the prosecutor notified the parole board of the
witness’s cooperative testimony); Johnston v. Love, No. 94-3727, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21426,
at *30–*35 & n.6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1995) (holding that Brady did not require the prosecution to
disclose the witness’s expectation of leniency when the witness’s lawyer stated that he knew
through “experience” that his client would benefit from giving incriminating testimony); Barrett
v. United States, 763 F. Supp 658, 656–61 & nn.2–3 (D. Me. 1991) (holding that “[d]espite Peti-
tioner's assertion that no other scenario can be imagined than an expectation of leniency, . . . .
the Court can readily ‘imagine’ that [the witness] expected nothing . . . other than a break from
the tedium of imprisonment”); Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp 901, 906 (N.D. Miss. 1980)
(holding that an individual “voluntarily became a witness for the state in the hope and expecta-
tion that leniency might be shown him, but no agreement, understanding or deal of any sort,
either express or implied, was made by the prosecution to secure his testimony”); Garcia v.
State, 711 S.W.2d 176, 177–78 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding a defendant’s conviction when a
codefendant testified that he did expect leniency but that his sole purpose in testifying was to
“tell the truth”); People v. Phillips, 711 P.2d 423, 432–34 (Cal. 1985) (holding that reversal was
not required where a witness testified with an expectation of leniency based on his attorney’s
advice to have “‘faith and trust’ in her (the attorney) and testify” for the state); Commonwealth
v. Viscosky, 83 Pa. Super. 96, 99–102 (1924) (upholding a defendant’s conviction when “the jury
were in possession of all the facts” surrounding a codefendant’s testimony).
31. Zuern, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 954.
32. Id. at 956.
33. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
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and Giglio,34 failed to disclose a plea agreement with a material wit-
ness and fellow inmate, Wayne Lewis.35
Although Lewis had been sentenced to prison for a maximum of
ten years for violating his probation, he testified for the prosecution
without the benefit of a formal agreement.36 Lewis testified that
“Zuern had expressed animus toward the guards. Thus, his testimony
was important in establishing prior calculation and design.”37 Al-
though both Lewis and the prosecution denied the existence of an
agreement, “[w]ithin a matter of days after having testified . . . the
state filed a motion to mitigate Lewis’ sentence. Shortly thereafter,
the judge who had sentenced Lewis suspended further execution of
that sentence.”38 Thus, Lewis was released from prison and avoided
the possibility of a ten-year sentence only days after testifying for the
prosecution against Zuern.
“According to Zuern, the temporal proximity between Lewis’
testimony and the suspension of his sentence demonstrate[d] that
Lewis provided that testimony pursuant to an agreement with the
prosecution.”39 The trial court reasoned that “given Lewis’ experience
with the criminal justice system, he would have had an expectation
that favorable testimony would result in his being rewarded by the
prosecution.”40 Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately concluded,
“such an expectation does not establish that such testimony was the
product of having been explicitly promised anything.”41 The defense
unsuccessfully argued “that the foregoing reasoning ‘countenances
the formation of agreements between witnesses and the State, based
on winks and nods, implicit understandings, soft words of hope im-
parted from the State to the witness that [are] never set [in] concrete
terms.’”42
Fundamentally, the Zuern court held that although Lewis had a
rational expectation of leniency, “nothing prevented [Zuern’s] coun-
sel from conducting . . . a cross-examination of Lewis” and “asking
him whether he hoped to get a benefit from testimony favorable to
34. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
35. Zuern, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 970–72.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 970.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 971.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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the prosecution.”43 Thus, the court concluded that cross-examination
was an effective procedural safeguard to secure Zuern’s right to a fair
trial.44
B. An Office Policy of Leniency
In Darden v. United States,45 Charles Darden was convicted of
transporting heroin across the United States–Mexican border.46 Dar-
den appealed his conviction, arguing that the testimony of a co-
conspirator, Sadie Mae Roberts, was obtained because the codefen-
dant “could have reasonably believed that she would receive lenient
treatment if she testified against appellant.”47 The defense argued that
the United States Attorney’s Office had an undisclosed office policy
of prosecuting drug traffickers for lesser offenses if they cooperated
with the prosecution in convicting a “bigger fish.”48 Roberts knew she
had to implicate Darden to benefit from the policy.49 The court read-
ily recognized that “[b]oth Miss Roberts and her attorney were aware
43. Id. at 971 n.21.
44. As Part IV.B demonstrates, however, cross-examination is ineffective as a method of
revealing a witness’s prejudices to the jury because such witnesses appear cloaked in a veil of
absolution and repentance (because they are waiving their rights against self-incrimination) and
because the scope of cross-examination is often limited (in that the attorney is unable to fashion
precise, nonrepetitive questions beyond “were you promised anything for your testimony?”).
See infra notes 151–59 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the prosecution did admit that a
basic understanding existed between the prosecution and Lewis. Zuern, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
Namely, if Lewis testified for the prosecution, then “if anyone asked, the prosecutor would indi-
cate that he had testified.” Id. Presumably, the only person of any consequence at trial who
would ask would be a judge. Thus, an agreement did exist to a certain extent, although the con-
sideration Lewis was to receive was ambiguous. One should remember that plea bargains gen-
erally are governed by the principles of contract law. E.g., United States v. Allerheiligen, Nos.
99-3144, 99-3154, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18529, at *46 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 2000). The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts states that when interpreting an ambiguous term in a contract,
“course of performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of trade.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(b) (1981). Primarily, the American Law Insti-
tute thought that course of performance, apart from express unambiguous language, is the most
reliable way to ascertain the intentions of two contracting parties. Id. § 203(b). In this particular
case, the course of performance was the state’s motion to commute Lewis’s sentence. Zuern, 101
F. Supp. 2d at 970. Thus, Zuern, in a commercial setting, certainly could establish the existence
of an agreement between the state and Lewis through basic contract principles. However, for
some inexplicable reason, the courts seem to hold that the principles of contract law provide
more protection to consumers, construction workers, and manufacturers than to criminal defen-
dants.
45. 405 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1969).
46. Id. at 1055.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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of this policy, and the consequent advantage to Miss Roberts to tes-
tify that her involvement was limited to her own use of the heroin.”50
Thus, Roberts’s testimony was inherently unreliable because of her
“strong motivation to implicate [Darden] and to exonerate” herself.51
However, the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction holding that “there
was not even a promise or an agreement . . . . There is only [the code-
fendant’s] reliance on the past policy of the United States Attorney’s
Office.”52 Therefore, “[t]he fact of a bargain, or of the hope or expec-
tation of leniency affect[ed] only the weight of the testimony, not its
admissibility.”53
In essence, the Darden court held that Darden’s right to a fair
trial was protected because “[t]he jury decided adversely to appellant
under proper instructions.”54
C. A Prosecutor’s Prior Course of Conduct
In Johnston v. Love,55 the defendant James Johnston filed a writ
of habeas corpus arguing that his multiple murder convictions should
be reversed because the prosecution failed to disclose the contents of
an agreement between the state and James Griffin, a material and in-
criminating state witness.56 At trial, Griffin testified that he overheard
a conversation in which Johnston discussed and planned the criminal
acts.57 At the time of his testimony, Griffin was incarcerated for burg-
lary and had a charge of conspiracy to commit a triple homicide
pending.58 On direct and cross-examination at trial, Griffin stated that
he did not have any deal with the prosecution.59 However, after
Johnston’s conviction, the Commonwealth dismissed the conspiracy
charges pending against Griffin.60
50. Id.
51. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
52. Darden, 405 F.2d at 1056.
53. Id.
54. Id. However, as Parts III.B and IV.C demonstrate, jury instructions do not effectively
reveal and jurors do not fully understand how prejudiced a witness testifying with a rational ex-
pectation of leniency is likely to be.
55. No. 94-3727, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21426 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1995).
56. Id. at *28–*29.
57. Id. at *27.
58. Id. at *30–*31.
59. Id. at *27.
60. Id. at *31.
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In a subsequent state court evidentiary hearing, Griffin and his
attorney testified that no promises, plea agreements, or understand-
ings were made with the prosecution before or during the trial of
Johnston.61 However, Griffin’s attorney did testify “that he knew,
based on his ‘experience’, that if his client cooperated fully with the
Chester County authorities, he would be treated ‘fairly’ by them
when they decided what sentence Mr. Griffin should receive and
whether additional criminal charges would be filed.”62 Moreover, the
attorney testified that his “primary motive in agreeing to have Mr.
Griffin testify without a plea bargain was to have his client avoid a
sentence which included a term of imprisonment.”63 Although the at-
torney had extensive experience with the prosecutorial methodology
of the county authorities, the district court held that an attorney’s ra-
tional “expectation of leniency [does] not have to be disclosed to the
defense, [even] assuming the Commonwealth [is] aware of it.”64
The court in Love relied on Alderman v. Zant 65 in holding that “a
belief by an attorney ‘that his client may be in a better position to ne-
gotiate a reduced penalty should he testify against a co-defendant is
not an agreement within the purview of Giglio.’”66 However, the Al-
derman court had recognized that “[e]ven mere ‘advice’ by a prosecu-
tor concerning the future prosecution of a key government witness
may fall into the category of discoverable evidence since it constitutes
an informal understanding which could directly affect the witness’s
credibility before the jury.”67 Nevertheless, the Love court must have
concluded that the difference between “mere advice” and the specific
experience of a seasoned attorney, coupled with the past course of
conduct of an individual prosecutor, was significant enough to war-
rant an affirmation of Johnston’s conviction.
II.  THE TWIN DANGERS OF THE FORMAL PLEA BARGAIN
The traditional plea bargain between a testifying codefendant
and a prosecutor has been the subject of considerable academic and
61. Id. at *32.
62. Id. at *32 n.6.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 22 F.3d 1541 (11th Cir. 1994)
66. Love, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21426, at *32 n.6 (quoting Alderman, 22 F.3d at 1555).
67. Alderman, 22 F.3d at 1554 (quoting Haber v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th
Cir. 1985)).
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judicial controversy. At the heart of this controversy is a justified fear
that the veracity and reliability of incriminating testimony is com-
promised by a market exchange.68 Courts and commentators have
recognized that a plea bargain creates two dangers to the integrity of
the judicial process and to the administration of justice; leniency cre-
ates a motivation to lie69 and encourages codefendants to shift
blame.70 Writing for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Eugene
Davis articulated the first concern by observing that “[i]t is difficult to
imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced
sentence.”71 The Supreme Court recognized this danger of fabrication
in Hoffa v. United States.72 In this Part, I examine recent cases that
question the reliability of accomplice testimony resulting from formal
plea bargains.
A. The First Danger: Singleton and Motivations to Lie
A panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently criticized
the use of bargained-for testimony in United States v. Singleton. In
Singleton I, Sonya Singleton appealed her narcotics conviction, argu-
ing that the prosecution obtained crucial testimony by offering leni-
ency to witnesses in violation of the federal antibribery statute codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).73 The antibribery statute states that
“[w]hoever . . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises any-
thing of value to any person, for . . . testimony . . . shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.”74 Sin-
gleton’s argument was unique and shocking because it questioned,
with a seemingly clear congressional statute that supported her posi-
tion, the “legality” of the ingrained and institutionalized method of
inducing witnesses to testify.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1254–57 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that
the witness admitted lying more than thirty separate times when a plea agreement required co-
operative testimony in return for a lenient sentence).
69. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
70. Cf. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599–600 (1994) (noting that a lenient in-
terpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) could encourage declarants to “mix false-
hood with truth,” see infra notes 91–101 and accompanying text).
71. United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987); accord Singleton
I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1350 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is difficult to imagine anything more valuable than
personal physical freedom.”), rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
72. 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966).
73. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1343.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)–(3) (2000).
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The Tenth Circuit panel held that the promises of leniency made
by the government in exchange for testimony against Singleton vio-
lated the federal antibribery statute.75 The Singleton I panel explicitly
conceded that its decision “rest[ed] in no way on the Constitution”
and was a “creature solely of statute.”76 However, in dicta, the panel
repeatedly questioned the ethical propriety of bargained-for testi-
mony by making statements in the following vein: “The promise of in-
tangible benefits imports as great a threat to a witness’s truthfulness
as a cash payment.”77 The decision created so much controversy and
anxiety in prosecutors’ offices that the Tenth Circuit vacated the
panel ruling on its own motion and ordered a rehearing en banc.78
In Singleton II, the full Tenth Circuit overturned the panel’s de-
cision and held that the antibribery statute “d[id] not apply to the
United States or an Assistant United States Attorney functioning
within the official scope of the office.”79 The court reasoned that a
prosecutor is a representative of the state in its sovereign capacity,
and thus the word “whoever” in 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), which con-
notes an application to persons and not to entities, did not apply to
the government.80 Moreover, and more persuasively, the court noted
that the plea bargain is “ingrained in our criminal justice system,”81
and therefore it “must [be] presume[d] [that] if Congress had in-
tended that [the antibribery statute] overturn this ingrained aspect of
American legal culture, it would have done so in clear, unmistakable,
and unarguable language.”82 Although Singleton II seemingly saved
the institution of bargained-for testimony from statutory ruin, neither
the case nor the court could quell the academic uproar that Singleton
I spawned.
Singleton I embodied a concern shared by academics, defense
lawyers, and defendants: that inducing a witness to testify creates a
75. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1351.
76. Id. at 1361.
77. Id. at 1350.
78. Singleton II, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
79. Id. at 1298.
80. Id. at 1300. Does this argument mean that corporations, as “entities,” cannot be prose-
cuted under the federal antibribery statute for purchasing favorable testimony? See id. (empha-
sizing that “whoever” refers to a person, not to an inanimate entity).
81. Id. at 1301 (citing The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 599–600 (1878)).
82. Id. at 1302.
MAZUR.DOC 03/01/02 1:14 PM
2002] IMPLICIT PLEA AGREEMENTS 1345
danger of fabrication.83 Although the Singleton I panel explicitly
stated that its decision rested solely on statutory construction, it was
clear from the reasoning, tone, and dicta of the decision that the panel
believed that the antibribery statute ought to apply to the govern-
ment.84 The panel speculated that § 201(c)(2) was enacted because
bargained-for testimony is “violative of public policy”85 since “‘prom-
ises of immunity or leniency premised on cooperation . . . may pro-
vide a strong inducement to falsify’” testimony.86 Therefore, the panel
interpreted the section broadly as applicable to the government be-
cause one “obvious purpose of the blanket prohibition in § 201 [was]
to keep testimony free of all influence so that its truthfulness is pro-
tected.”87 Interestingly, the panel never addressed why the antibribery
statute had never been applied to the government in the thirty-five
years since its enactment.88 However, the court in dicta asserted that
the application of § 201(c)(2) to the government was paramount to
the justice system:
The judicial process is tainted and justice cheapened when factual
testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or money. Because
prosecutors bear a weighty responsibility to do justice and observe
the law in the course of a prosecution, it is particularly appropriate
to apply the strictures of § 201(c)(2) to their activities.89
Even assuming that Singleton I was decided wrongly, the decision
is relevant because it typifies judicial skepticism toward the veracity
of bargained-for testimony. The Supreme Court and almost every
federal circuit court of appeals has questioned the sincerity and accu-
racy of incriminating accomplice testimony given pursuant to a coop-
83. See, e.g., James P. Dowden, United States v. Singleton: A Warning Shot Heard Round
the Circuits?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 897, 933 (1999) (arguing that in an accomplice plea agreement “a
defendant is potentially exposed to false testimony that is cloaked with the power and majesty
of the U.S. government leading many jurors to presumptively believe its validity”); Timothy
Hollis, An Offer You Can’t Refuse? United States v. Singleton and the Effects of Wit-
ness/Prosecutorial Agreements, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 433, 434 (2000) (asserting that “prosecuto-
rial deals” in exchange for testimony “create an incentive for informants to lie”).
84. Singleton I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1346–48 (10th Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 1347.
86. Id. at 1350 (quoting United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980)).
87. Id.
88. The court did address three other cases in which a criminal defendant had appealed a
conviction and argued that crucial testimony was admitted in violation of § 201(c)(2), finding
each case unpersuasive. See id. at 1356–58.
89. Id. at 1347.
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eration agreement.90 However, courts have relied on full disclosure
and the adversary system to justify, uphold, and preserve the institu-
tion of witness inducements.
B. The Second Danger: Williamson and the Tendency to Shift Blame
“Accomplice plea agreements tend to produce unreliable testi-
mony because they create an incentive for the accomplice to shift
blame to the defendant or other co-conspirators.”91 Accomplices’ mo-
tivations to shift blame have been analyzed exhaustively by courts
and academics under the hearsay exception for statements against
penal interests codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). This
exception allows the prosecutor to admit into evidence a statement
against the penal interests of the declarant at trial when the declarant
is unavailable, the declarant had an understanding that the statement
was against his or her penal interests, and a reasonable person would
not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true.92
What is interesting about Rule 804(b)(3) is that courts often admit a
declarant’s statement inculpating a codefendant uttered by the de-
clarant as part of a self-inculpatory narrative. The jurisprudence ap-
plying Rule 804(b)(3) in this fashion sheds substantial light on the
motivation of a declarant-defendant to shift blame and make state-
ments tending to subject another codefendant to criminal liability.
90. The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of accomplice plea bargains and the veracity of
that testimony in two landmark cases. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972)
(holding that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose a promise of leniency in exchange for a co-
conspirator’s testimony constituted a violation of due process that required a new trial); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) (holding that the testimony of a paid informer is consti-
tutionally permissible, even though the informer “may have had motives to lie,” due to cross-
examination and trial by jury). Likewise, some federal circuit courts have encountered the
problem directly. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that testimony in exchange for monetary compensation is no different than testimony
in exchange for a reduced sentence and will be admitted); United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d
1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no motive for falsification where the witness was not prom-
ised anything in exchange for his testimony).
91. Yvette A. Beeman, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 800, 802 (1987); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 461 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t is not unusual for a guilty person who knows that he is suspected of a crime to
try to shift blame to someone else . . . .”); Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1208 (9th Cir.
2000) (asserting that one possible reason for a witness to testify falsely is “to shift blame when
plea bargaining for a lighter sentence”).
92. 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 489, at
1128–31 (1980).
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The federal rules of evidence maintain that hearsay—out-of-
court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted93—is in-
admissible unless an exception applies.94 This rule reflects the Advi-
sory Committee’s concern that the trustworthiness and reliability of
hearsay is suspect because the statements are not given under oath
and the testimony is not subject to a vigorous cross-examination to
reveal defects in the declarant’s perception, memory, or articulation.95
Moreover, when hearsay statements are admitted, the factfinder is
deprived of the opportunity to closely observe and scrutinize the de-
meanor of the declarant on the witness stand.96 Thus, hearsay state-
ments are generally inadmissible because the reliability and trustwor-
thiness of the testimony cannot be effectively guaranteed by the
adversary system.
However, the Federal Rules of Evidence have carved out myriad
exceptions to the general prohibition.97 Primarily, these exceptions are
based on situations in which the probative value and necessity of ad-
mitting the hearsay statement is substantial and the circumstances
under which the statement was uttered indicate “indicia of reliability
sufficient to overcome the dangers typically posed by hearsay.”98 One
of these exceptions recognizes that when an individual makes a
statement against proprietary or penal interests—“I just robbed the
bank”—that statement is extremely probative and sufficiently reliable
because a reasonable person would not subject himself to criminal li-
ability unless he believed the truth of the matter asserted.99
When drafting this exception in 1969, the Advisory Committee
recognized that statements against an individual’s penal interest pos-
sess indicia of reliability.100 However, the Committee noted that such
93. FED. R. EVID. 801.
94. Id. 802.
95. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1362, at 3
(James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974).
96. See, e.g., Henry S. Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible Imponderables, 47
A.B.A. J. 580, 580–81 (1961) (quoting numerous authorities discussing the importance of de-
meanor evidence).
97. FED R. EVID. 803–807.
98. Emily F. Duck, The Williamson Standard for the Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay
for Statements Against Penal Interest, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1084, 1085 (1995).
99. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
100. See Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 385 (1969) (“The circumstantial guaranty of reliability
for declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do not make statements which
are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.”).
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statements should be admissible only against the declarant, and that
statements inculpating a codefendant should be inadmissible.101 Pri-
marily, the Committee reasoned that “statements of codefendants
have traditionally been regarded with suspicion because of the readily
supposed advantages of implicating another.”102 Therefore, the Com-
mittee explicitly limited the hearsay exception: “This example does
not include a statement or confession offered against the accused in a
criminal case, made by a codefendant or other person implicating
both himself and the accused.”103 Nevertheless, when the Supreme
Court issued the final draft of this hearsay exception, it omitted the
Advisory Committee’s limitation on the admission of statements in-
culpating codefendants.104
Traditionally, the case law interpreting Rule 804(b)(3) deter-
mined the reliability and admissibility of a statement inculpating a
codefendant by analyzing whether the incriminating statements were
uttered as part of a larger self-inculpatory narrative.105 For example, in
United States v. Lieberman,106 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that statements of a co-conspirator were admissible against a co-
defendant, even if the statements were more damaging to the co-
defendant than the declarant, if the statements were “part and parcel”
of a self-inculpatory narration.107 However, since the enactment of
Rule 804(b)(3), the federal appeals courts have varied their ap-
proaches to and interpretation of this exception. Therefore, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Williamson v. United States108 to
“clarify the scope of the hearsay exception for statements against pe-
nal interest.”109
101. Id. at 386.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 378.
104. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
a third party’s self-inculpatory statements were against his penal interests and admissible be-
cause his “version did not attempt to trivialize his own involvement in the nefarious scheme by
shifting responsibility to his cohorts; rather, it frankly disclosed the extent of his own participa-
tion without any effort to demonstrate that others were really the ones to blame”).
106. 637 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1980).
107. Id. at 103 (holding that a declarant’s admission was admissible as a statement against
penal interests against a codefendant when the codefendant told him not to open the storeroom
door for anyone when they were engaged in marijuana trafficking because it demonstrated the
declarant’s knowledge and was therefore inculpating against both the declarant and the co-
defendant).
108. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
109. Id. at 596.
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In Williamson, the defendant appealed his narcotics conviction to
the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court erred
when it admitted an incriminating confession made by an accomplice
under Rule 804(b)(3).110 The police in Williamson stopped the declar-
ant, Reginald Harris, for weaving on the highway.111 Harris consented
to a search of his vehicle, and the police discovered nineteen kilo-
grams of cocaine in the trunk.112 After fabricating a story, Harris made
a confession to Agent Walton of the Drug Enforcement Agency in
which he admitted transporting the cocaine for Williamson.113 Addi-
tionally, in the course of his confession, Harris noted that Williamson
was traveling in a car in front of Harris, and that Williamson had
turned around after the police stopped Harris and could see that the
truck was being searched.114 At trial, Harris refused to testify against
Williamson even though the state offered him use immunity and the
court held him in contempt for his refusal.115 On a motion by the
prosecution, the district court ruled that Agent Walton could relate
the confession of Harris, including the statements that inculpated
Williamson, to the jury under Rule 804(b)(3).116
Writing for the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor held that
“the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow
admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made
within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.”117 Justice
O’Connor wrote that Rule 804(b)(3) was founded on the principle
“that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not espe-
cially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they
believe them to be true.”118 However, Justice O’Connor noted that
“[t]he fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confes-
sion does not make more credible the confession’s non-self-
inculpatory parts,” because one of the most effective methods of de-
ceiving is to mix truth with falsehood.119 This deception is particularly
persuasive when the truth is self-inculpatory because the declarant is
110. Id. at 598.
111. Id. at 596.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 597.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 597–98.
117. Id. at 600–01.
118. Id. at 599.
119. Id.
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cloaked in a veil of absolution and repentance.120 Moreover, Justice
O’Connor reiterated a judicial principle that directly contradicts the
idea that incriminating statements by a codefendant should be given
substantial weight: “‘The arrest statements of a codefendant have tra-
ditionally been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his strong moti-
vation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a code-
fendant’s statements about what the defendant said or did are less
credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.’”121
Like prosecutors’ use of Rule 804(b)(3) before Williamson,
prosecutors’ use of accomplice plea agreements poses a difficulty for
the factfinder. Because the testifying accomplice has pleaded guilty
and openly admits his role in the criminal activity, his falsehoods and
blame-shifting might appear more persuasive to a jury; they are
mixed with the truth and self-inculpatory statements. However, many
courts consider the risk of prejudice and perjury to be counterbal-
anced by full disclosure, confrontation, and the ability of a properly
instructed jury to reasonably judge the credibility and weight of each
piece of evidence and testimony.
III.  THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS PROTECTING THE ACCUSED
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Federal Rules of
Evidence have a “liberal thrust” favoring the admission of relevant
evidence.122 Although the Federal Rules provide that relevant evi-
dence may be inadmissible if the likely prejudice of the evidence sub-
stantially outweighs its probative value, there are troublesome situa-
tions where evidence is both highly probative and prejudicial. For
instance, the testimony of an accomplice against a codefendant, ob-
tained by the prosecution in exchange for leniency or immunity, is il-
lustrative of a situation in which evidence is highly probative and
prejudicial. In these situations, the courts must balance the probative
value of eyewitness, insider testimony against the twin dangers of ac-
complice testimony. However, when the scales of prejudice and pro-
120. See id. at 599–600 (noting that truth is particularly persuasive when it has a “self-
inculpatory nature”).
121. Id. at 601 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986)).
122. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993); Beech Aircraft Corp.
v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988). The Federal Rules of Evidence require a trial court to admit
relevant evidence—evidence having any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less
probable—unless the prejudicial effect of that evidence substantially outweighs the evidence’s
probative value. FED. R. EVID. 401–403.
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bativity are equally substantial, the “liberal thrust” of the evidence
rules direct the courts to admit the testimony.123
The Federal Rules of Evidence and the judiciary rely on other
procedural safeguards to expose the infirmities of such evidence to
the jury and to protect the accused. For example, in Hoffa v. United
States,124 the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether bargained-for testimony creates a motivation to lie that
jeopardizes the constitutional rights of the accused under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.125 The Court considered
whether this relevant and highly probative testimony was so prejudi-
cial that the adversary system was a constitutionally ineffective
method of protecting the rights of the accused. The Court explicitly
recognized the danger of fabrication, but the Court reasoned that this
danger did not mandate constitutional inadmissibility because the ac-
cused is protected by “[t]he established [procedural] safeguards of the
Anglo-American legal system.”126 These established safeguards in-
clude the right of the accused to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses, the role of the judge in properly instructing the jury on the
law, and the duty of the jury to follow the spirit and letter of these in-
structions.127
A. Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and Discovery
The right to cross-examine witnesses is the fundamental proce-
dural safeguard protecting the accused from the twin dangers of bar-
gained-for accomplice testimony. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
the accused the right to confront adverse witnesses.128 The Supreme
Court and academics have recognized that “cross-examination is the
core component” of the Confrontation Clause129 because “it is the
123. FED. R. EVID. 403.
124. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
125. Id. at 310–11.
126. Id. at 311.
127. Id.
128. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404–05 (1965) (holding that the right of cross-
examination is part of an accused’s right to confront adverse witnesses); see also Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (“Confrontation means more than being allowed to confront
the witness physically. ‘Our cases construing the [Confrontation] clause hold that a primary in-
terest secured by it is the right of cross-examination.’”) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 418 (1965)).
129. E.g., Frank T. Read, The New Confrontation—Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
49 (1972) (“[C]ross-examination is the core component to be preserved—because it is essential
to our adversary system . . . .”).
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very heart of an adversary theory of litigation.”130 Cross-examination
tests the reliability of evidence and preserves the “fundamental prin-
ciple of our adversary system [that] maintains that a factfinder
should . . . not rely on the words of a witness” until the opponent has
had the opportunity for cross-examination.131
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the gov-
ernment “to disclose to the defense and to the trial jury the existence
of plea bargaining negotiations with a key witness.”132 The disclosure
of a formal plea agreement enables the defense to cross-examine the
witness about his motivations for testifying, any tangible benefits he
will gain from incriminating the defendant, and the possibility that the
declarant is merely shifting blame. The failure of the government to
disclose a plea agreement is a violation of the defendant’s due process
rights and grounds for reversal.133 In Napue v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court held that the “jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability
of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,
and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the wit-
ness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may de-
pend.”134 Therefore, evidence of a testifying codefendant’s plea
agreement with the government tends to impeach the codefendant’s
credibility and exculpate the accused, and, in accord with Brady v.
Maryland,135 the “suppression by the prosecution of [such] evi-
dence . . . violates due process.”136
Thus, the courts and many academics agree that the accused is
protected from the twin dangers of accomplice testimony because the
130. MODEL CODE OF EVID. 221 (1942); cf. Davis, 415 U.S. at 315 (“Confrontation means
more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.”).
131. Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35
UCLA L. REV. 557, 586 (1988) (describing the “clear” role of confrontation in the adversary
system).
132. United States v. Fontenot, 483 F.2d 315, 325 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a failure to
disclose such information “deprives a defendant of Fifth Amendment due process of law”); see
also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972) (same).
133. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154–55 (stating that when a witness’s reliability may be determi-
native of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting the witness’s credibility falls
within the general rule that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial); see also
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959) (holding that a failure by the government to correct
knowingly false testimony about the existence of a plea agreement violated the Fifth Amend-
ment rights of the accused).
134. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
135. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
136. Id. at 87.
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defense is armed with the right of cross-examination and the details
of the accomplice’s plea agreement.
B. Jury Instructions
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “any
party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the
law.”137 Jury instructions are intended “to focus [the jury’s] attention
on the essential issues in the case and inform [the jury] of the permis-
sible ways in which these issues may be resolved.”138 Jury instructions
also function to inform the jury about issues of credibility, motivation,
and interest. Thus, when the government calls an accomplice to tes-
tify, the trial judge may give the jury an instruction in the following
vein:
[A]ccomplice testimony is of such nature that it must be scrutinized
with great care and viewed with particular caution when you decide
how much of that testimony to believe.
. . .
You should ask yourselves whether these so-called accomplices
would benefit more by lying, or by telling the truth. Was their testi-
mony made up in any way because they believed or hoped that they
would somehow receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely?
Or did they believe that their interests would be best served by testi-
fying truthfully? If you believe that the witness was motivated by
hopes of personal gain, was the motivation one which would cause
him to lie, or was it one which would cause him to tell the truth? Did
this motivation color his testimony?
In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding what
credence and what weight, if any, you will want to give to the ac-
complice witnesses.139
137. FED. R. CRIM. P. 30.
138. United States v. Ribaste, 905 F.2d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 1990); see also United States v.
Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 34 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The purpose of jury instructions is to instruct the jury
clearly regarding the law to be applied in the case.”); United States v. Assi, 748 F.2d 62, 65 (2d
Cir. 1984) (“The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury clearly and succinctly of the
role it is to play and the decisions it must make.”).
139. 1 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 7.01, at 7-17
to 7-18 (1992) (“Instruction 7-5: Accomplices Called by the Government”); see also COMM. ON
MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4.11 (2000) [hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS]
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In all the federal circuits, district courts use specific pattern jury
instructions that address the credibility of bargained-for testimony
obtained from either an accomplice or a paid informant.140 Many ap-
peals courts have held that the trial court’s failure to give an “admoni-
tory instruction to scrutinize an accomplice’s testimony” can be re-
versible error because such an instruction is an essential procedural
method to secure a fair trial for the accused.141 Jury instructions ques-
tioning the credibility of accomplice testimony serve two essential
procedural functions. First, the instruction reinforces the defense’s
cross-examination by attacking the generalized trustworthiness of ac-
complice testimony. Second, the instruction protects the accused from
ineffective, or limited, cross-examination that fails to apprise the jury
of the devious motivations inherent in codefendant testimony. Thus,
jury instructions on witness credibility serve as a second procedural
safeguard protecting the accused from the twin dangers of accomplice
testimony.
(“You should consider such testimony with greater caution than that of an ordinary witness.”);
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 1.1 (1997) [hereinafter ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS]:
The testimony of some witnesses must be considered with more caution than the tes-
timony of other witnesses. For example, a paid informer, or a witness who has been
promised that he or she will not be charged or prosecuted, or a witness who hopes to
gain more favorable treatment in his or her own case, may have a reason to make a
false statement because the witness wants to strike a good bargain with the Govern-
ment.
140. See, e.g., COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, FIFTH
CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) 1.15 (1997) [hereinafter FIFTH
CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (“Accomplice-Informer-Immunity” instruction); COMM. ON
FED. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 3.13 (1998) [hereinafter SEVENTH CIRCUIT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS] (“Witnesses Requiring Special Caution” instruction); JUDICIAL COMM. ON
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 4.05 (2000) [hereinafter EIGHTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (“Testimony of
Accomplice” instruction); id. at 4.06 (“Testimony of Informer” instruction); NINTH CIRCUIT
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 139, at 4.10 (“Testimony of Informer” instruction); id. at 4.11
(“Testimony of Accomplice” instruction); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note
139, at 1.1 (“Accomplice-Informer-Immunity” test).
141. E.g., United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Leon-
ard, 494 F.2d 955, 959–62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Gonzalez, 491 F.2d 1202, 1207 (5th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Wasko, 473 F.2d 1282, 1284 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Davis,
439 F.2d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Shriver, 838 F.2d 980, 983 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that although giving cautionary instructions is “the better practice,” such instruc-
tion is not required).
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IV.  RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF LENIENCY AND THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF ESTABLISHED PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
TO PROTECT THE ACCUSED FROM THE TWIN DANGERS
Courts, academics, and legislatures have recognized the danger
of unfair prejudice that accomplice plea bargains create for the ac-
cused.142 Many of them also have recognized, however, that proce-
dural rules—particularly rules providing for disclosure, rigorous
cross-examination, and the proper instruction of a jury—may help
lessen the danger.143 Conspicuously absent from this debate is an
equally pervasive threat: the implicit plea bargain. In the case of im-
plicit plea bargains, the procedural safeguards touted in Hoffa are in-
effective. This Part shows that the twin dangers of a formalized plea
bargain—motivations to lie and to make self-exculpatory state-
ments—exist regardless of whether an accomplice testifies pursuant
to a formal plea bargain. Moreover, this Part describes psychological
research demonstrating what circumstances encourage false confes-
sions and the effect of such confessions on the ability of the jury to
properly deliberate and weigh the truthfulness of evidence.
A. The Twin Dangers and Incriminating Testimony Absent a Formal
Agreement
Courts recognize that accomplice testimony poses the same dan-
ger whether the accomplice is motivated by a formal plea bargain or
by the mere expectation of leniency.144 Social science research con-
firms this hypothesis.145 For example, a recent study by Professor Saul
M. Kassin analyzes whether police are better able to obtain a confes-
sion from a criminal defendant by using explicit rather than implicit
promises of leniency.146
142. See supra Part II.
143. See supra Part III.
144. See, e.g., People v. Wallin, 197 P.2d 734, 737 (Ca. 1948) (“[E]xperience has shown that
the evidence of an accomplice should be viewed with care, caution and suspicion because it
comes from a tainted source and is often given in the hope or expectation of leniency or immu-
nity.”).
145. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions:
Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233,
247–48 (1991) (presenting research that suggests that interrogation “minimization” techniques,
while seemingly noncoercive, actually may communicate an implicit offer of leniency to the sus-
pect and communicate an assumption to the jury that the interrogator must have had an eviden-
tiary basis for presuming the defendant’s guilt).
146. Id. at 234–37.
MAZUR.DOC 03/01/02 1:14 PM
1356 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1333
Professor Kassin’s data indicates that explicit and implicit prom-
ises “are functionally equivalent in their impact” on an individual’s
decision to confess.147 Kassin reasons that this result occurs because,
as Professors Richard J. Harris and Gregory E. Monaco note in a
1978 study, “people often process information ‘between the lines.’”148
Therefore, whether a promise of leniency is explicit or implied, the
probability of the subject taking action in reliance on those promises
is related more to the degree that the subject relies on and trusts the
source of the information than to the differentiation the brain makes
between the explicit and the implied.149 Kassin speculates that both
explicit and implicit promises, like threats, “have the potential to coax
innocent people into confessing to crimes they did not commit.”150
Thus, accomplices place similar reliance on explicit and implicit
promises of leniency. Courts “explicitly” have recognized this hy-
pothesis, and social science “implicitly” has confirmed it with an
analysis of varying promises in the context of confessions. Neverthe-
less, the procedural safeguards promulgated by the Court and recog-
nized in Hoffa for safeguarding the justice system from inaccuracy are
ineffective to protect the accused from the dangers of unfair prejudice
posed by implicit agreements or promises between the government
and a testifying witness.
B. Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and Discovery
Cross-examination of a witness’s expectations of leniency is an
ineffective method of safeguarding the accused from unfair prejudice
for three reasons. First, a plea agreement between the government
and any key witness must be disclosed to the defense;151 however, a
witness’s rational “expectation of leniency [does] not have to be dis-
closed to the defense, [even if] the Commonwealth [is] aware of it.”152
147. Id. at 248.
148. Id. (citing Richard J. Harris & Gregory E. Monaco, Psychology of Pragmatic Implica-
tion: Information Processing Between the Lines, 107 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1–22
(1978)).
149. See id. at 249 (noting that more research is needed to evaluate the effects of tactics de-
signed to establish the interrogator as the subject’s ally).
150. Id. at 248.
151. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
152. Johnston v. Love, No. 94-3727, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21426, at *33 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18,
1995); see also Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that an attorney’s
belief “that his client may be in a better position to negotiate a reduced penalty should he testify
against a co-defendant is not an agreement within the purview of Giglio”).
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This legal maxim is true even if the expectation of leniency is reason-
able and rationally based on past experience or an informal office
policy. For instance, in Johnston v. Love, Griffin testified against
Love in a murder case.153 Griffin was advised by his attorney that
“based on [the attorney’s] ‘experience’, that if [Griffin] . . . cooper-
ated fully with the . . . authorities, he would be treated ‘fairly’ by them
when they decided what sentence [he] should receive.”154 After the
trial, the attorney admitted that his “primary motive in agreeing to
have Mr. Griffin testify without a plea bargain was to have his client
avoid a sentence which included a term of imprisonment.”155 How-
ever, the attorney’s experience, the Commonwealth’s previous prac-
tice with this particular attorney, and the informal policy of giving
witnesses reduced sentences for testifying was neither disclosed nor
discoverable by the defense.156 Therefore, unlike a formal plea bar-
gain, cross-examination of a witness’s rational expectation of leniency
is hampered because the expectation is not subject to the procedural
safeguards of mandatory disclosure or discovery.
Second, although the defense still has the right to cross-examine
the witness about any hopes or expectations he might have, the trial
court often forbids the defense from aggressively pursuing the matter.
For instance, in United States v. Page,157 after the United States Attor-
ney impeached his own witness on direct examination, the defense at-
tempted to elicit testimony about the witness’s pending charges to ex-
pose her expectations of leniency.158 The trial court curtailed the
cross-examination because the government already had impeached
her credibility on the same point.159 The Sixth Circuit held that the
trial court properly limited the cross-examination because “[t]he con-
frontation clause is not violated when a district court . . . reasonably
limit[s] cross-examination.”160 Thus, the right of cross-examination is
more easily curtailed when the declarant’s rational expectation of le-
niency is not concrete or formalized because the defense is unable to
153. Johnston, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21426, at *3.
154. Id. at *32 n.6.
155. Id. at *33.
156. Id. at *28–*29.
157. Nos. 99-5361, 99-5449, 99-5451, 99-5456, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31115 (6th Cir. Nov. 9,
2000).
158. Id. at *14–*15.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *16.
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ask precise, nonrepetitive questions to elicit testimony about the wit-
ness’s reasonable hopes.
Third, an accomplice who testifies without an agreement is
cloaked in a practically impenetrable veil of absolution and repen-
tance. The accomplice has waived any Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination and has been exposed to conviction. As Jus-
tice O’Connor recognized in Williamson, the credibility and weight of
the testimony is substantially bolstered because the jury is more likely
to believe a defendant whose testimony is self-inculpatory and who
“officially” has nothing to gain and everything to lose from testifying
under oath.161 Moreover, the defense’s power to pierce the declarant’s
veil of credibility is inhibited because the implicit agreement is not
discoverable162 and because the trial court in its discretion can limit
cross-examination.163
C. Jury Instructions
As they are used in American courtrooms, jury instructions are
an ineffective method of safeguarding the accused from unfair preju-
dice caused by an accomplice who testifies without a formal agree-
ment. Although courts have recognized that the dangers of accom-
plice testimony exist whether or not a formal agreement has been
reached,164 many courts will not give a cautionary instruction unless
the accomplice has a formal plea bargain. For instance, district courts
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits instruct the jury to be particularly
skeptical of a witness’s credibility if the witness is a paid informer or a
codefendant with a grant of immunity or leniency.165 In United States
v. Tanios,166 “[t]he defense requested an instruction cautioning the
jury on its assessment of the testimony of an accomplice . . . . In de-
clining the request, the trial judge stated that there was no evidence
of any offer of immunity or leniency and that the traditional instruc-
tions on witness credibility were adequate to cover the situation.”167
161. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599–600 (1994).
162. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
165. FIFTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 140, at 1.14–1.15; ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 139, at 1.1–1.2.
166. 82 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1996).
167. Id. at 100.
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District courts in the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits use differ-
ent cautionary instructions for an accomplice who testifies with a
formal agreement and an accomplice who testifies without a formal
agreement.168 For instance, when an accomplice testifies under an
agreement, courts in the Sixth Circuit instruct the jury to consider the
“testimony with more caution than the testimony of other witnesses
[and to] [c]onsider whether his testimony may have been influenced
by the government’s promise.”169 Moreover, the instruction states that
the accomplice would have been prosecuted had he not cooperated,
and it describes any other benefits the accomplice received.170 How-
ever, when an accomplice testifies without an agreement, courts in the
Sixth Circuit merely instruct the jury that the testimony should be
considered with caution; it fails to instruct the jury that the testimony
might be motivated by a promise or an expectation of gain.171
Even assuming that cross-examination and jury instructions were
sufficient to protect the accused, social science research suggests
that—even with these “effective” procedural safeguards—jurors are
incapable of rationally weighing the credibility of an accomplice who
testifies without a formal plea agreement.172
Although research indicates that jurors will concede that a con-
fession obtained through implicit promises is “‘involuntary’ by law,”
generally “jurors react with ambivalence to confessions elicited by
positive forms of inducement.”173 In Kassin’s study, mock jurors were
presented with transcripts of trials where a confession was obtained
either by threats, explicit promises, or a process called minimization,
in which implicit promises of leniency are used.174 Jurors “fully dis-
counted confessions brought on by threats.”175 Jurors “partially dis-
counted confessions that were prompted by an explicit promise.”176
However, jurors gave substantial credence and weight to confessions
168. COMM. ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, SIXTH
CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7.07–7.08 (1991) [hereinafter SIXTH
CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS]; EIGHTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 140, at 4.04–
4.05; NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 140, at 4.9–4.11.
169. SIXTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 168, at 7.07.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 7.08.
172. See Kassin & McNall, supra note 145, at 248–49 (calling for further research to deter-
mine the effects of different interrogation styles upon juror valuations of confessions).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 239–50.
175. Id. at 247.
176. Id. at 247–48.
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obtained by implicit promises of leniency, and although forty-seven
percent judged the confession involuntary, these same jurors “pro-
ceeded to vote guilty.”177
Therefore, even if a trial court gives a jury instruction like that
given in the Sixth Circuit when an accomplice testifies without a plea
bargain, Kassin’s data indicate that the jury likely will concede that
the accomplice has a motivation to lie. Nevertheless, the jury will give
substantially more weight to the testimony of an accomplice without a
formal agreement than one who has a formal agreement. This extra
weight and credibility is not deserved. As noted before, academics,
courts, and social science research all indicate that an accomplice has
an equal motivation to lie regardless of whether he testifies with a
formal plea agreement or a rational expectation of leniency.178
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Creating a Discoverable Non-Binding Agreement Between
Prosecutors and Codefendants
“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and
not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it spe-
cific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural jus-
tice . . . .”179 “[T]he Supreme Court has ‘long emphasized’ that a
prosecutor is held to ‘a higher standard of behavior’ than defense
counsel.”180 Unlike defense counsel, the prosecutor has an ethical and
legal duty to protect the procedural rights of the opposing party.181
One such legal duty prevents the prosecution from presenting false
evidence and mandates the reversal of any conviction where the
prosecutor knew, or reasonably should have known, that false evi-
177. Id. at 248.
178. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text.
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1997).
180. John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Public Prosecutors,
47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 546 (1994) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
181. The Supreme Court, and lower courts, long have held that the prosecutor is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1113 (Cal. 1998) (noting that California has taken an analogous view
toward its own state prosecutors).
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dence was presented.182 “Due process jurisprudence developed by the
Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland also requires prosecutors to
produce to defendants exculpatory evidence useful to impeach gov-
ernment witnesses.”183 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Giglio held
that Brady requires the prosecution to disclose the content of plea
agreements forged with key witnesses.184 Courts consistently have
held, however, that a prosecutor is not required to disclose evidence
of a witness’s rational expectation of leniency even if the prosecution
is aware of it and the defense is not.185
The motivations to fabricate and self-exculpate are equally per-
vasive whether the testifying codefendant has a formal agreement or
merely a rational expectation of leniency.186 Under the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, a prosecutor has the responsibility to ensure
that loopholes in the system, or the prosecutor’s use of his or her dis-
cretion, do not adversely affect the court’s administration of justice
and the procedural rights of the accused.187 Therefore, the gray area of
informal plea agreements should be of considerable concern to prose-
cutors and courts. Prosecutors must realize that when they create ra-
tional expectations of leniency, their fundamental ethical duty to act
as a “minister of justice” is implicated.
Prosecutors can resolve the problem posed by rational expecta-
tions of leniency in three ways: (1) stop using the testimony of co-
defendants; (2) create formal plea agreements with all testifying co-
defendants; or (3) create discoverable, admissible, and non-binding
agreements that memorialize the codefendant’s rational expectations
of leniency and the fact that the witness may be granted leniency be-
cause of his or her testimony. The first choice is no choice at all. It ig-
nores the realities of the justice system as it is administered. Codefen-
dant testimony is often the only testimony directly implicating the
accused,188 and, therefore, a system that did not allow prosecutors to
182. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
183. Bessler, supra note 180, at 548 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
184. See supra note 7.
185. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part IV.A.
187. Cf. supra note 179 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., People v. Hudson, 194 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Mich. 1972) (upholding the defen-
dant’s conviction of unarmed robbery based on testimony provided by others who had partici-
pated in the robbery).
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use this evidence would be inefficient and repugnant to justice.189 The
second choice—requiring the prosecutor to strike a formal bargain
with every testifying codefendant—would impinge severely on the
prosecutor’s executive function.190 The prosecutor should be allowed
to “convince” codefendants to testify without a legislative or ethical
mandate requiring that the codefendant benefit from providing in-
criminating testimony.
The third choice, however, recognizes the dangers posed by co-
defendant testimony and makes a justified and reasonable compro-
mise between the executive function of the prosecution and the pro-
cedural rights of the accused. A discoverable, admissible, and non-
binding agreement between the prosecution and the testifying code-
fendant, memorializing the codefendant’s rational expectations of le-
niency and the possibility of prosecutorial leniency, would substan-
tially mitigate the prejudice posed by codefendant testimony elicited
without a formal agreement. This document would give defense coun-
sel the opportunity to zealously cross-examine the codefendant about
his or her expectations, and the document would apprise the jury that
this cross-examination is actually based on a rational and documented
expectation of leniency and not simply on the codefendant’s desire
for repentance and absolution.
B. Jury Instructions
Courts and prosecutors should reconsider whether jury instruc-
tions are adequate to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial when
a witness testifies against the defendant based on a rational expecta-
tion of leniency but without a formal plea agreement. Traditionally,
courts have held that “mere expectations” of benefit are sufficiently
exposed by properly instructing the jury.191 Courts in all federal cir-
cuits limit, or fail to give altogether, instructions on the potential haz-
189. See generally JAMES BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 1.08 (1975)
(noting that a substantial number of codefendants and accomplices agree to give incriminating
testimony in exchange for leniency).
190. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“‘[T]he decision whether or
not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in
[the prosecutor’s] discretion.’”) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)); see
also People v. Nelson, 238 N.W.2d 201, 203–04 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (“‘For the judiciary to
claim power to control the institution and conduct of prosecutions would be an intrusion on the
power of the executive branch of government and a violation of the constitutional separation of
powers.’”) (quoting Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 194 N.W.2d 693, 699 (Mich.
1972)).
191. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966).
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ards of accomplice testimony motivated by “mere expectations.”192
This is so even though overwhelming evidence suggests that the po-
tential for malicious intent is just as pervasive whether a witness is
motivated by a formal agreement or a rational expectation of leni-
ency.193 Moreover, social science research indicates that individual ju-
rors are incapable of properly weighing the credibility of witnesses
testifying without a formal agreement.194
Courts should make substantial changes to the jury instructions
that accompany accomplice testimony, and scholars should make
similar changes to pattern instructions. Although social science and
common sense indicate that formal plea agreements and rational ex-
pectations of leniency create equal motivations to fabricate and self-
exculpate, courts in a majority of the federal circuits use different jury
instructions for codefendants who testify pursuant to a formal plea
agreement and codefendants who testify based on a rational expecta-
tion of leniency.195 Courts should give a single pattern jury instruction
that applies in both circumstances. This instruction should urge jurors
to question the credibility of accomplice testimony in general, re-
gardless of whether it is based on a formal agreement. The instruction
suggested in Sand’s Modern Federal Jury Instructions would certainly
suffice:
[A]ccomplice testimony is of such nature that it must be scrutinized
with great care and viewed with particular caution when you decide
how much of that testimony to believe.
. . .
You should ask yourselves whether these so-called accomplices
would benefit more by lying, or by telling the truth. Was their testi-
mony made up in any way because they believed or hoped that they
would somehow receive favorable treatment by testifying falsely?
Or did they believe that their interests would be best served by testi-
fying truthfully? If you believe that the witness was motivated by
hopes of personal gain, was the motivation one which would cause
him to lie, or was it one which would cause him to tell the truth? Did
this motivation color his testimony?
192. See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text.
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In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding what
credence and what weight, if any, you will want to give to the ac-
complice witnesses.196
This instruction likely would apprise a reasonable jury of an accom-
plice’s various motivations to fabricate, lie, and cooperate with the
prosecution. The instruction merely recognizes the truth about ac-
complice testimony.
C. Cross-Examination
Courts consistently limit the defense counsel’s cross-examination
of a witness about his or her expectations of leniency.197 For instance,
in United States v. Page,198 the prosecutor impeached his own testify-
ing codefendant by exposing the charges pending against the co-
defendant on direct examination.199 As a result, the trial court in Page
did not permit defense counsel to thoroughly cross-examine the co-
defendant regarding the pending charges, because, according to the
trial court, such cross-examination was redundant.200 Page was de-
cided wrongly in the trial court and affirmed wrongly on appeal. As
Justice O’Connor noted in Williamson v. United States,201 a codefen-
dant who testifies without a grant of immunity or plea agreement
waives his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,
and, as a result, is cloaked in a practically impenetrable veil of absolu-
tion and repentance.202 Consequently, Justice O’Connor noted, the
credibility and weight of the codefendant’s testimony is substantially
bolstered because the jury is more likely to believe a defendant whose
testimony is self-inculpatory and who “officially” has nothing to gain,
and everything to lose, from testifying to the statements under oath.203
Thus, the prosecutor has a substantial interest in the “unencumbered”
incriminating testimony of the codefendant. The codefendant’s credi-
bility is unjustifiably bolstered by the lack of a plea agreement, and
196. See 1 SAND ET AL., supra note 139, ¶ 7.01, at 7-17 to 7-18.
197. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.
198. Nos. 99-5361, 99-5449, 99-5451, 99-5456, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31115 (6th Cir. Nov. 9,
2000).
199. Id. at *14–*17.
200. Id. at *17.
201. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
202. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the prosecutor’s witness is protected by a judicial system that limits
effective cross-examination.
Courts, therefore, should permit substantial, and sometimes re-
dundant, cross-examination of codefendants who testify with expecta-
tions of leniency but without the obvious benefit of a formal plea bar-
gain. For instance, defense counsel should be able to ask the
codefendant whether the codefendant is aware that he is waiving his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, whether the co-
defendant is aware of the penal consequences of this waiver, whether
the codefendant has any expectation of leniency, and, if not, why the
codefendant would want to expose himself or herself to such criminal
liability with no hope of leniency or benefit. Moreover, defense coun-
sel should be permitted to remind the codefendant of the laws and
penalties relating to perjury and be permitted to explore this line of
questioning such that the defendant’s procedural rights are ade-
quately protected.
CONCLUSION
Courts and academics have recognized the dangers posed by
bargained-for testimony.204 The Supreme Court nevertheless has con-
sistently held that the existent procedural safeguards are sufficiently
stringent to protect the accused from any unfair prejudice created by
bargained-for testimony.205 These safeguards fail to protect the rights
of the accused where the witness’s testimony is motivated not by a
formal plea agreement but by an expectation of leniency. Witness tes-
timony motivated by an expectation of leniency may implicate the
policy concerns underlying Brady, may be unreliable under the Su-
preme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, and may pose
ethical problems for prosecutors. These problems, however, can be
mitigated if the judicial system makes three substantial yet unobtru-
sive changes to the current rules regulating accomplice testimony. By
creating discoverable non-binding agreements between codefendants
and prosecutors, giving stringent jury instructions, and allowing broad
cross-examination, the prejudices posed to the accused by accomplice
testimony, motivated by rational expectations of leniency, can be
mitigated.
204. See supra Part II.
205. Again, for the purposes of this Note, this position is acceptable. See supra note 3.
